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ABSTRACT
Commercially sexually exploited children (CSEC) are commonly treated as criminals and
punished for offenses committed as a result of being trafficked. Recent state-level legislative
efforts have sought to prevent minors from being held criminally liable for being commercially
sexually exploited. This study offers an analysis of the effects of such laws on the criminalization
of CSEC through the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Data on the number of child
arrests for prostitution (1995-2014) and safe harbor laws were collected from the FBI Uniform
Crime Reports, the Polaris Project website, and the 2015 ECPAT report. The findings of the
study suggest that the enactment of safe harbor legislation had no discernible effect on the mean
number of annual child arrests. Continued efforts to educate and train relevant actors on the issue
of domestic minor sex trafficking are needed. This study offers the first comprehensive
evaluation of safe harbor laws in the U.S.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The sex trafficking1 of children in the United States, also known as Domestic Minor Sex
Trafficking (DMST2) and Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children (CSEC3), is a severe and
ubiquitous problem that takes place in every state (Estes and Weiner 2001, 38; Finklea,
Fernandes-Alcantara, and Siskin 2015, 1). The demand for commercial sex acts with children has
been steady and profits to sex traffickers have increased (Finklea 2014a, 1). Traffickers prey on
an extremely vulnerable population. A number of studies indicate that 70 to 90 percent of
commercially sexually exploited children and adult women have been victims of sexual abuse
prior to recruitment (Lloyd 2011, 65). The average age at which minors begin to be
commercially sexually exploited is between 12 and 14, although some of them are as young as
five (Estes and Weiner 2001, 92; Kotrla 2010, 182). The vast majority of sex trafficking victims
in the United States are U.S. citizens or Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs) (Heiges 2009, 429;

1

The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) was the first comprehensive federal law to address human trafficking
(NHTRC 2016). The TVPA is deemed to be the most important statute in the fight against trafficking in persons (Ibid 2016). The
law “does not define sex trafficking per se”; nevertheless, it provides a definition for “severe forms of trafficking in persons,”
which includes sex trafficking (Finklea, Fernandes-Alcantara, and Siskin 2015, 1). Based on the federal law’s definition of severe
forms of trafficking in persons, sex trafficking can be described as the “recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or
obtaining of a person for the purposes of a commercial sex act … in which the commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or
coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such an act has not attained 18 years of age;” (Ibid. 2016; TVPA 2000, 6).
2
Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking (DMST) refers to the commercial sexual exploitation of children (U.S. citizens or Legal
Permanent Residents) within U.S. borders (Finklea, Fernandes-Alcantara, and Siskin 2015, 1; Kotrla 2010, 181; Smith,
Vardaman, and Snow 2009, iv). Shared Hope International (SHI), an organization dedicated to ending sex trafficking and
assisting victims of sex slavery, defines DMST as “child sex slavery, child sex trafficking, prostitution of children, commer cial
sexual exploitation of children (CSEC), and rape of a child” (Ibid. 2009, iv; Ibid. 2010, 181-182; SHI 2016). The organization
offered this definition on a report funded by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2009 (Ibid. 2009, iv).
3
A review of the literature indicates that there is no general consensus among professionals in the field of social sciences on a
single definition of the term commercial sexual exploitation of children (CSEC) (Mitchell et al. 2011, 44; Mukasey, Daley, and
Hagy 2007, 1). As explained in the second chapter of this thesis, the United States government still fails to provide a clear
definition of the term. The very fact that specialists cannot reach an agreement on a sole definition of CSEC indicates that there is
a significant problem surrounding the issue. However, most experts believe that CSEC takes place in a multitude of forms,
including, but not limited to, pornography; sex trafficking; exotic dancing; escort services; “mail order bride trade, early forced
marriages”; sex tourism; commercial sex acts; and other sexual services (Bang et al. 2014, 3; Mitchell et al. 2011, 44-45;
Mukasey, Daley, and Hagy 2007, 1; Smith, Vardaman, and Snow 2009, iv-21). For the purposes of this paper, the terms
commercially sexually exploited children, sex trafficked children, and exploitation of children for sexual purposes will be used
interchangeably as well as the words minors, youth, and children, all of which will be used to refer to individuals under the age of
18. That is to say, the term commercial sexual exploitation of children will solely be used to refer to child sex trafficking cases in
the United States and not to all the other ways that CSEC can take place.
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Siskin and Wyler 2011, 268). In actuality, the U.S. is the only industrialized democracy where
the majority of victims of trafficking are its own citizens 4 (Heiges 2009, 429-430; TVPA 2000,
20). In spite of the fact that U.S. citizens and LPRs make up the largest number of trafficking
victims in the nation, experts have managed to convey an image that this issue is predominantly
a third world country concern (Bang et al 2014, 1; Walker-Rodriguez and Hill 2011, 1). As a
consequence, no systematic efforts have been made to evaluate the scope of CSEC in the U.S.
and little is known about the effectiveness of policy responses, especially at the state level
(Adams, Owens, and Small 2010, 8; Shields and Letourneau 2015, 6).
The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), the “seminal piece of U.S.
legislation in the fight against CSEC,” classifies the sex trafficking of minors (18 and under) as a
federal crime (Adams, Owens, and Small 2010, 1; Finklea 2014b, 65). Most importantly, the
legislation maintains that these children ought to be treated as victims and “should not be
inappropriately incarcerated, fined, or otherwise penalized for unlawful acts committed as a
direct result of being trafficked” (TVPA 2000, 5). As of 2016, all 50 states and the District of
Columbia have anti-trafficking legislation and many states continue to pass amendments to
improve these laws (Clayton, Krugman, and Simon 2013, 145). In addition, U.S. states and D.C.
also have laws defining “age-of-consent,” commonly known as “statutory rape laws,” which
determine the age at which individuals can legally consent to having sex (Clayton, Krugman, and
Simon 2013, 145-146). In spite of the fact that children who are bought and sold are deemed to
be victims under both federal and state laws, they are commonly treated as criminals by law
enforcement in most jurisdictions (Epstein and Edelman 2013, 4; Finklea 2014b, 69; Polaris

4

The fact that the United States is the only developed country where the overwhelming majority of sex trafficking victims are
Americans, and not foreign nationals as most individuals believe to be true, makes a strong case for the study of this pressing
issue.
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Project 2015, 1; Shields and Letourneau 2015, 3). Arrested juveniles are oftentimes charged,
prosecuted, and convicted under an act of prostitution or prostitution-related crimes (Lloyd,
2012; Saunders 2015, 33).
Most criminal investigations and prosecutions of cases involving the sex trafficking of
minors are conducted at the state level, where policies do not necessarily fall in line with federal
prescriptions for the treatment of CSEC (Finklea 2014b, 69). As stated by Rachel Lloyd (2011),
when money is exchanged, states seem to disregard statutory rape laws and girls suddenly
become mature enough to consent (139). In addition, states continue to allow children to be
arrested and prosecuted for engaging in commercial sex acts because these activities are
generally “viewed through the lens of prostitution laws, which have roots in societal efforts to
prohibit and prevent vice” (Clayton, Krugman, and Simon 2013, 146). Even when victims are
recognized, they are typically “sent into the juvenile system on prostitution and related charges”
and are often denied access to appropriate services or a support system (Clayton, Krugman, and
Simon 2013, 146; Epstein and Edelman 2013, 4).
As a means to correct for the inconsistencies in the treatment of minors by law
enforcement and the criminal justice system at the state and federal levels, starting in 2008, states
began to enact what became known as Safe Harbor Laws (Shields and Letourneau 2015, 3).
These laws seek to decriminalize prostitution for minors, recognize that the needs of those
victims exceed the capabilities of the criminal justice system, and acknowledge that criminal
justice responses are more often than not harmful to those minors (Shields and Letourneau 2013,
3; Wayman 2013). Nonetheless, there has been no comprehensive assessment of the effect of
these laws to date (Shields and Letourneau 2015, 4).
The main purpose of this study is to answer the following research question: which model

3

of Safe Harbor Law is most effective in decreasing the average number of annual arrests of sex
trafficked children? As of 2013, only 18 states had passed safe harbor laws granting various
degrees of immunity to minors (Polaris Project 2013, 2). In this paper, I suggest that as states
pass Safe Harbor Laws with a higher number of provisions safeguarding children’s rights, we
can expect, on average, to see a decrease in the mean number of annual arrests of commercially
sexually exploited children. Although an arrest does not signify pressing charges or a conviction,
it further victimizes sex trafficked children and points to a number of other pressing issues, such
as lack of law enforcement training in victim identification and lack of available alternative
services to these minors (Geist 2012, 69; Saunders 2015, 76). Counterintuitively, states with safe
harbor laws “may continue to arrest and prosecute” children for acts committed as a result of
being trafficked (Finklea 2014a, 10). This paper investigates the inconsistencies between the
provisions of safe harbor legislation and their implementation by law enforcement as well as
assesses the efficacy of different safe harbor laws in diminishing the re-victimization of
commercially sexually exploited children (Jekowsky 2014).
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The term Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children (CSEC) was first formulated in
the 1996 Declaration and Agenda for Action for the First World Congress Against the
Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, which took place in Stockholm, Sweden with 122
governments represented (Shields and Letourneau 2015, 3). The CSEC can be defined as the
“sexual commodification of children’s bodies for the purposes of monetary or material gain”
(Bang et al. 2014, 3; Declaration 2015, 1; Mukasey, Daley, and Hagy 2007, 1). One of the main
accomplishments of the 1996 Declaration was offering the first working definition of CSEC,
which constituted the first step in reframing child prostitution as sexual exploitation of minors
(Adams, Owens, and Small 2010, 1; Shields and Letourneau 2015, 3). As stated by Clayton,
Krugman, and Simon (2013), language is an important tool in changing popular perceptions of
behaviors and events (30). In other words, reframing the issue is key in modifying public notions
and “sympathies”; “sexual exploitation” more correctly describes what happens to these children
while “child prostitute seem[s] to denote who the child [is] as opposed to what [is] being done to
her” (Lloyd 2011, 215).
Nevertheless, to date, the United States has not provided a clear or universal definition of
CSEC, which creates inconsistencies in charging decisions at the federal and state levels
(Adams, Owens, and Small 2010, 7). The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA)
offers the definition that falls more closely in line with the one provided by the 1996 Declaration.
The TVPA asserts that individuals who are induced to perform commercial sex acts without
having attained 18 years of age are victims of a “severe form of trafficking in persons” (TVPA
2000, 7). A commercial sex act means “any [sex] act, … [for] which anything of value is given
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to or received by any person,” such as money, food, shelter, and drugs (Finklea, FernandesAlcantara, & Siskin 2015). The item of value does not necessarily need to be received by the
minor—it can be given to a pimp or trafficker (Finklea, Fernandes-Alcantara, & Siskin 2015).
Notably, the TVPA only provides recommendations for the treatment of sex trafficked minors
and does not mandate or require states to comply with these principles. This is particularly
significant because the vast majority of cases involving CSEC are adjudicated at the local and
state levels (Finklea 2014b, 69). As mentioned earlier, CSEC are routinely treated as criminals
and punished by state authorities for crimes committed as a consequence of being trafficked
(Clayton, Krugman, and Simon 2013, 146; Epstein and Edelman 2013, 4; Lloyd, 2012; Saunders
2015, 33). The great variance in state laws with respect to sexual activities and minors, such as
differences in age of consent and in the criminality of solicitation and prostitution, may account
in part for the lack of uniformity in the treatment of sex trafficked children under federal and
state laws (Finklea 2014b, 69).
There are a limited but significant number of studies on police encounters and the
culpability of commercially sexually exploited minors (Finkelhor and Ormrod, 2004; Halter
2010; Mitchell, Finkelhor, and Wolak 2010). This research suggests that sex trafficked children
are often treated as perpetrators of a crime. Finkelhor and Ormrod (2004) derived data from the
National Incident-Based Reporting System covering 13 states and 76 law enforcement
jurisdictions from 1997 to 2000 (4). Over the four-year period, there were 241 incidents of
commercial sexual exploitation of minors, with 229 children being treated as delinquents (4). In
spite of that, as pointed out by Saunders (2015), this study needs to be considered with caution
due to the small sample examined and the fact that the time-period of the evaluation takes place
before the passing of the TVPA (70). The TVPA might have played a role in changing the
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perceptions of law enforcement with relation to CSEC and for this reason the findings of their
study “may not be reflective of modern trends” (Saunders 2015, 70).
Mitchell, Finkelhor, and Wolak (2010) in turn, surveyed a national sample of 2,598 local,
county, and state law enforcement agencies by mail on whether they had made arrests or
detentions in cases involving the CSEC; however, only five percent of those agencies reported
making such an arrest (20-22). Their findings indicate that 53 percent of minors were treated as
victims, 31 percent as offenders, and 16 percent as both victims and offenders; however, in this
last case, charges were either eventually dropped and/or children had been referred to services,
which led to a reclassification of their status from both offenders and victims to only victims
(29). For this reason, the final results indicate that 69 percent of minors were treated as victims
and 31 percent as perpetrators. Another prominent study on the culpability of CSEC is the one
conducted by Halter (2010). Halter carried out a content analysis of police case files of
prostitution incidents in which children were involved (153). Halter contacted agencies in six
major cities in western, southern, and eastern parts of the U.S. (153-154). The results of the study
indicate that between 2000 and 2006, 60 percent of CSEC were treated as victims and 40 percent
as delinquents (156). Children were more likely to be treated as victims if they were first-time
offenders, if their exploiter had been identified, if they cooperated with the police, and if the
arrest was the result of a report (156). The findings of the study suggest that the aforementioned
factors are associated with an increased odds ratio for police conceptualization of sex trafficked
children as victims of child sexual exploitation (Halter 2010, 152-156).
States began to enact Safe Harbor Laws as a means to solve the problem of lack of
uniformity in the treatment of sex trafficked children by law enforcement at the national and
state levels and prevent youth from being held criminally liable for being commercially sexually
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exploited. The term emerged in 2008 when the state of New York passed the first such act in the
United States (Clayton, Krugman, and Simon 2013, 171). Since then, 17 additional states have
enacted some sort of safe harbor legislation (Shields and Letourneau 2015, 5). Although there is
great variance among states in the provisions of these laws, there are some commonalities that
deserve to be highlighted: safe harbor laws seek (1) to treat sex trafficked children as victims of
commercial sexual exploitation and not offenders; (2) to divert minors from delinquency
procedures to specialized and supportive services (the needs of these children go beyond
criminal and justice juvenile systems’ abilities); and (3) to make juveniles immune from
prosecution (only a small number of states have this provision) (Dysart 2014, 278; Shields and
Letourneau 2015, 3; Wayman 2013). As mentioned earlier, by 2013, 18 states had passed some
sort of safe harbor law protecting CSE minors (Polaris Project 2013).
Following the passing of safe harbor laws, a small number of studies have evaluated law
enforcement’s treatment of commercially sexually exploited children in the United States (Geist
2012; Mehlman-Orozco 2015; Musto 2013; Sherman 2013). Arrests and detentions are seen for
the most part as a negative approach to the fight against the CSEC (Mehlman-Orozco 2015;
Musto 2013; Sherman 2013). As stated by Geist (2012), the law enforcement and justice systems
should utilize their resources to “go after the real criminals – the pimps and the johns” and not to
arrest, detain, and prosecute children victims of a “system of commercial sexual exploitation”
(70). The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child maintains that the arrest,
detention, and incarceration of children should only be employed as “a measure of last resort and
for the shortest appropriate period of time” (United Nations 1989). Nonetheless, the United
States to date remains the only nation that refuses to ratify this treaty (UNICEF 2016; United
Nations 1989).
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Prominent trafficking scholars have continuously opposed law enforcement’s centralized
power and wide discretion in guiding efforts to combat human trafficking (Musto 2013, 272).
Some advocates and law enforcement personnel affirm that arresting young girls is the only way
to “help them” and by doing so is to become “the best friends they have”; according to this point
of view, although they know they cannot “arrest their way out of the problem,” to put them in jail
is the only way to offer them assistance and the services they need (Geist 2012, 84; Musto 2013,
258-267-268). Nevertheless, Musto believes that arresting minors for prostitution-related
offenses is still ineffectual and problematic for a number of reasons (268-271). A great number
of victims may not be interested in being saved by the police due to historical legacies of law
enforcement violence, detention, and “harassment of voluntary sex workers” (272). There is also
a lack of research on minors’ views of these rescue efforts to combat trafficking and
rehabilitative strategies (271). Musto calls for new approaches that do not depend on the
“detention-to-protection paradigm” and do not require victims to get access to services by getting
in contact with the law enforcement and justice systems (273). As mentioned in the 2010 Texas
Supreme Court judicial decision on the commercial sexual exploitation of minors, the idea “that
the juvenile system is the only portal to such services for children is simply not true” (Clayton,
Krugman, and Simon 2013, 171).
Law enforcement responses to the issue of DMST might also be ineffective because girls
of color, who are disproportionately affected by this crime, are more vulnerable to institutional
violence and, as a result, are distrustful of official systems (Sherman 2013, 14). There is strong
evidence in the literature that arresting minors increases the probability of future arrests and
subsequent offending (Liberman, Kirk, and Kideuk 2014, 364). The repeated contacts with the
justice systems occur due to surveillance and labeling effects, which cause greater scrutiny of a
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person’s future actions (Liberman, Kirk, and Kideuk 2014, 364; Shields and Letourneau 2015,
4).
A more recent study evaluated the effects of safe harbor laws on the criminalization or
the number of arrests of CSEC (Mehlman-Orozco 2015, 57). Mehlman-Orozco analyzed the
number of child arrests in four states that, according to her, had enacted and implemented some
form of safe harbor law at the time of her analysis: Connecticut, Texas, New York, and
Washington (55). Mehlman-Orozco utilized the FBI Crime Report data files and the Polaris
Project (2013) as sources of information on the number of child arrests for prostitution between
1994 and 2011 and safe harbor policies, respectively (56). The state of Illinois was initially
included in her analysis, but since more than 50 percent of its information on child arrests had
been imputed by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), she
decided to remove it from her sample (56). The number of adults arrested for prostitution was
used as a measurement of control as a means to avoid Type I error, or random variations in the
number of child arrests that might not necessarily have been attributable to the enactment of safe
harbor laws (55). A comparison of the number of arrests and arrest trends both before and after
the implementation of safe harbor laws in the four states previously mentioned suggest that the
enactment of such laws had no discernible effect on the number of children arrested for
prostitution; that is to say, they did not lead to a lower number of detentions (57-58).
However, Mehlman-Orozco adopts a very simplistic approach in her attempts to answer
this research question. Although she recognizes some of the limitations of her study—such as the
small sample size, lack of access to comprehensive data, and the small number of states with
post-enactment information on arrests—she fails to identify other weaknesses. For example,
Mehlman-Orozco treats all safe harbor laws as if they were the same, ignoring important
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variations in the provisions granted in each state (Polaris Project 2015). Even though these laws
share some common principles, there are some important differences among them that may
account for the variation in the number of arrests found in her study.
For instance, the states of New York and Connecticut require the proof of force, fraud, or
coercion for child victims of sex trafficking while Texas and Washington State do not (Polaris
Project 2014). This provision imposes a much heavier burden of proof on sex trafficked children
and is at odds with the prescriptions of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, which
does not require proof of force, fraud, or coercion in cases of commercial sexual exploitation of
minors (18 and under); as previously mentioned, they are automatically considered to be victims
of sex trafficking. The availability and the type of services available to CSEC may also have an
impact on law enforcement’s decision to arrest a minor. Washington mandates that each one of
its counties keep secure shelters for sexually exploited children (Shields and Letourneau 2015,
5). New York, in turn, tailors its services to meet the individual needs of sex trafficked minors
while Connecticut provides limited to no direct services to these children (5). Most importantly,
Washington has funding provisions for the development and implementation of training for law
enforcement personnel who come into contact with sex trafficked children; on the other hand,
New York mandates the development of training for law enforcement personnel, but does not
provide direct funding for it, while Connecticut does not mandate training for law enforcement
officers under the provisions of its safe harbor law (5).
In addition, Mehlman-Orozco’s decision to include Texas in her analysis is questionable.
Although Texas is recognized for its efforts to combat the sex trafficking of minors, the state has
yet to enact a safe harbor law (Polaris Project 2014). A 2010 Texas Supreme Court ruling
overturned the sentencing of a 13-year-old who had been convicted for solicitation, stating that
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the minor was actually a victim of commercial sexual exploitation and not an offender (Ibid.
2015, 53). This decision ultimately created legal precedence. However, if her goal is to evaluate
the criminalization of commercially sexually exploited children post safe harbor laws
implementation, she should either exclude Texas from her analysis or change her research
question/objectives. Ultimately, although all safe harbor laws have a victim-centered approach,
they provide children with different levels of protection and have distinct provisions, such as
different ages of consent and the granting of complete immunity from prosecution or
adjudication that allows for diversion (Shields and Letourneau 2015, 4; Weiss 2015, 7). It is
important to recognize these differences in order to conduct an analysis of the effectiveness of
these laws. A better way to describe the differences in the number of arrests of CSEC before and
after the implementation of safe harbor laws is through the use of a model, one that can actually
account for the existing variances between each state’s safe harbor laws. This thesis addresses
some of the shortcomings of Mehlman-Orozco’s study and provides an assessment of the
implementation of safe harbor laws using law enforcement responses as evidence of the success
or failure of these policies.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN
As previously mentioned, the goal of this thesis is to answer the following research
question: which model of safe harbor law is most effective in decreasing the average number of
annual arrests of commercially sexually exploited children? In this analysis, I hypothesize that as
states pass safe harbor laws with a higher number of provisions safeguarding children’s rights,
we can expect to see a decrease in the average number of annual arrests of CSEC. This paper
utilizes ordinary least squares regression (hereinafter OLS regression or simply OLS) 5, as a
means to examine the impact of different models of safe harbor laws on the average number of
annual arrests of sex trafficked children (Johnson, Reynolds, and Mycoff 2015, 485; Kellstedt
and Whitten 2013; 176).
OLS regression is a statistical method of analysis commonly used in political science and
in the social sciences in general (Allison 1999, 2; Armstrong 2001, 324; Eye and Schuster 1998,
xi; Hayashi 2011, 3; Johnson, Reynolds, and Mycoff 2015, 485; Kellstedt and Whitten 2013;
176; Kennedy 1998, 12; Wilcox 2003, 182). Many scholars believe OLS to be the principal
multivariate method and the most straightforward technique of regression analysis; some authors
go as far as to claim that linear least squares is the “benchmark against which other methods can
be and have been checked” (Armstrong 2001, 324; Eye and Schuster 1998; Kennedy 2008, 43;
Krueger and Lewis-Beck 2008, 5; Lewis-Beck and Lewis-Beck 2015, xi). The findings of a
methodological content analysis of articles published between the years of 1990 and 2005 in the
American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, and the Journal
of Politics demonstrate that OLS regression is “by far the most popular method,” appearing in
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OLS regression is also known as linear least squares.
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roughly 31 percent of all scientific research papers (Krueger and Lewis-Beck 2008, 2-3-5;
Lewis-Beck and Lewis-Beck 2015, xi).
OLS regression is a mathematical procedure utilized to estimate the relationship between
one or more independent variables, in this paper, a given model of safe harbor legislation, and a
dependent variable, in this case, the average annual number of commercially sexually exploited
minors arrested for prostitution (International Encyclopedia 2008; Johnson, Reynolds, and
Mycoff 2015, 47-48; Kennedy 1998, 11). The goals of OLS are to determine whether the
independent variable(s) of interest affect(s) the dependent variable and to estimate the magnitude
and significance of such effect, if any (Allison 1999, 1-2). Ordinary least squares estimate the
relationship between the variables of interest by minimizing the difference between the predicted
and observed values of the dependent variable, depicted as a straight line (International
Encyclopedia 2008). The aim is to find the slope and the constant of an equation that minimize
the squared vertical distances between the line drawn and the data points (Johnson, Reynolds,
and Mycoff 2015, 47-48). Given the simplicity of the statistical method and its popularity in the
field, OLS regression is utilized to estimate the causal effect of the implementation of safe harbor
laws through the use of pre and post enactment (independent variable) measures of the dependent
variable (average number of child arrests).
Data for the average number of child arrests is derived from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program information on Persons Arrested. The
UCR Program has been the basis for researchers, criminal justice students, law enforcement
executives, and the general public looking for crime information in the country (FBI 2015). It
gathers data from more than 18,000 university/college, tribal, city, county, state, and federal law
enforcement agencies (FBI 2015). The UCR Program essentially provides the most complete and

14

thorough information on persons arrested and crimes, both at the national and state levels.
Nonetheless, even though commercially sexually exploited children are considered to be sex
trafficking victims under federal law, the FBI includes these minors under the “prostitution and
commercialized vice” category in its arrested persons report. The language used by the FBI UCR
should be consistent with the term adopted by the federal law, which more accurately describes
the experiences of these children.
Information for the measurement of the independent variable is drawn from the Polaris
Project website and the 2015 End Child Prostitution Child Pornography and Trafficking of
Children for Sexual Purposes (ECPAT) report titled “Steps to Safety: A Guide to Drafting Safe
Harbor Legislation to Protect Sex Trafficked Children” (hereinafter Steps to Safety). The Polaris
Project is deemed to be the leading organization in the global fight against modern-day slavery
(NHTRC 2015). The NGO also offers a thorough evaluation of the anti-trafficking efforts of all
50 states and D.C., based on 10 categories of laws that seek to eradicate human trafficking and
support victims (Polaris Project 2014). One of these categories is the enactment of safe harbor
legislation granting immunity for CSEC or diversion and specialized services (Ibid. 2014). The
independent variables are also measured based on information provided by the 2015 ECPAT
guide on safe harbor policies (Weiss 2015). The ECPAT is an international network of
organizations dedicated to eradicating all forms of CSEC (ECPAT 2016b). The network has 90
member groups located in 82 countries; these organizations strive to eliminate four main types of
CSEC: exploitation of children for sexual purposes, child sex tourism, child pornography, and
child sex trafficking (ECPAT 2016a; ECPAT 2016b). The ECPAT has recently published a very
comprehensive and thorough report evaluating safe harbor laws that were in effect by March 1,
2015, in 19 states and the District of Columbia (Weiss 2015, 1). The report analyzes the safe

15

harbor laws in the same 18 states under scrutiny in this paper.
In this project, in order to account for the variations between the different formats of safe
harbor policies, a model is built and each U.S. state receives an index score reflecting its efforts
to eradicate CSEC within their states. Analysis of existing safe harbor policies indicate that the
basic legal framework of the successful implementation of such laws needs to include the
following criteria: decriminalization or diversion, training, funding, specialized services,
increased penalties, and lower burden of proof (Birckhead 2011; Geist 2012; Jekowsky 2014;
Polaris Project 2014; Shields and Letourneau 2015).
1- Decriminalization or Diversion
Sex trafficked children are victims of commercial sexual exploitation and therefore
cannot be held criminally accountable and cannot be punished for prostitution (reclassification)
(Birckhead 2011, 1111; Geist 2012, 87; Jekowsky 2014; Polaris Project 2014). The
decriminalization of minors “refers to policy changes to refrain from arresting and prosecuting
youth for prostitution offenses” (Jekowsky 2014; Shields and Letourneau 2015, 4). Diversion
refers to redirecting minors to appropriate services in lieu of adjudication or juvenile detention. It
varies between states and oftentimes is utilized at the discretion of the justice system during
delinquency procedures (Birckhead 2011, 1111; Geist 2012, 88; Jekowsky 2014; Shields and
Letourneau 2015, 4).
Decriminalization and diversion are essentially the centerpieces of the legislation. As
previously mentioned, safe harbor laws seek to treat sex trafficked minors as victims and not as
perpetrators of a crime and/or to divert them from delinquency procedures to appropriate
services. In this paper, the decriminalization of sex trafficked children is defined as provisions
that prevent or prohibit criminal charges or penalties to be brought against these minors. States

16

that provide immunity from prosecution to child victims of commercial sexual exploitation are
deemed to have a decriminalization provision. In this thesis, I hypothesize that states with
decriminalization and diversion provisions are more likely to experience a lower average number
of annual child arrests.
2- Training
All professionals who might encounter commercially sexually exploited youth, primarily
first respondents (law enforcement, social workers, EMTs), should be trained to use their first
approach as an opportunity for intervention (Geist 2012, 91-92; Jekowsky 2014; Polaris Project
2014; Shields and Letourneau 2015, 5). In most cases, law enforcement officers are the first ones
to come into contact with sex trafficked children. Thus, law enforcement agents have a unique
role as first respondents. The results of the study conducted by Mitchell, Finkelhor and Wolak
(2010) demonstrate that law enforcement responses to the sex trafficking of minors are pivotal in
establishing whether these children are perceived as victims or offenders (18). In essence, the
fate of these minors hinges on how well informed these professionals are on the issue and on
how well trained they are on the handling of cases involving the CSEC as prescribed by law.
Laws that allow commercially sexually exploited children to be arrested, prosecuted, and
incarcerated have a huge impact not only on how law enforcement agents view commercially
sexually exploited children but also on how these minors perceive themselves (Martin 2002, 397;
Finklea 2014b, 69). Given the significant role that law enforcement officers play on determining
the culpability of these minors, I hypothesize that training is a significant variable in predicting
the average number of annual arrests of sex trafficked children.
3- Funding
The effective implementation of safe harbor laws requires adequate funding provisions
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for the training of “relevant actors” and the protection and provision of services to sex trafficked
youth (Geist 2012, 92; Jekowsky 2014). The allocation of funds for the implementation of safe
harbor legislation ensures that government agencies will carry out and uphold these laws.
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (2016), funds are utilized for five
main purposes: (1) to finance training for state employees (i.e. law enforcement officers); (2) to
offer appropriate services for survivors; (3) to arrest and bring legal proceedings against child
sex traffickers; (4) to fund special services for at-risk youth; and (5) to provide parenting skills
training. Without a funding provision, there is no certitude that government agencies will
apportion funds from their budgets for the enactment of safe harbor policies. Since funding is
such a vital component of the implementation of safe harbor laws, especially to what pertains to
the provision of training to law enforcement agents, I propose that this variable plays an
important role in decreasing the average number of annual child arrests.
4- Specialized Services
Access to appropriate services—such as counseling, education, shelters, psychological
and physical therapy—is one of the key components of safe harbor policies (Geist 2012, 89-90;
Jekowsky 2014; Shields and Letourneau 2015, 4-5). Emphasis is given to a holistic approach that
involves a number of professionals that come into contact with sex trafficked minors at different
points of the provision of services for them (Geist 2012, 89-90). As stated by Geist, without
specialized services, children are “released into the ‘revolving door’ of exploitation and arrest”
(74).
As pointed out in the literature review, a state’s availability of supportive services plays a
role in a law enforcement officer’s decision to arrest a minor for an act of prostitution. Some
professionals claim that to arrest sex trafficked children is to help them to get the services that
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they need; others believe that there are more effective ways of accomplishing this goal, stating
that this is a social services and not a criminal justice system issue (Geist 2012, 84; Musto 2013,
258-267-268). In other words, the police might be faced with the question of whether to arrest in
order to provide services or to keep them away from their traffickers or to not arrest if services
can be provided without the need for an apprehension or if their state’s criminal justice and
social services systems are ill-equipped to assist minors who had experienced multiple layers of
trauma (Geist 2012, 74). Although the provision of services is a central component of safe harbor
laws, it may or may not play a definitive role in the decision to arrest a minor. For these reasons,
I hypothesize that specialized services may or may not be associated with a lower mean number
of annual arrests of sex trafficked minors.
5- Increased Penalties and Lower Burden of Proof
Safe harbor policies must have provisions for harsher punishments and penalties (i.e.
fines) for traffickers (i.e., pimps) and solicitors (i.e., johns) as a means to deter this criminal
activity (Geist 2012, 91; Jekowsky 2014; Shields and Letourneau 2015, 5). State laws also need
to have a provision that guarantees that elements of force, fraud, or coercion are not necessary
for the prosecution and conviction of sex traffickers of children (Polaris Project 2014).
Both of these provisions have been placed under the same category because they are
closely related; they are tested separately, however, in order to assess their individual effects on
the dependent variable. The prescription of harsher penalties for child traffickers and the
requirement of a lower burden of proof for the sex trafficking of children may not necessarily
cause the average number of arrests to decrease. For example, there is a significant number of
cases involving the commercial sexual exploitation of minors in which children either act on
their own (i.e., children who engage in commercial sex acts as a means to get money or goods,
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survival sex) or in which the police are not able to find evidence of the existence of a third party
exploiter (Mitchell, Finkelhor, and Wolak 2010, 21-25). Such cases are particularly important
because law enforcement agents tend to perceive children with an exploiter (mainly pimps) as
innocent (i.e., not subject to an arrest) and minors reportedly acting on their own as culpable (i.e.,
subject to an arrest and criminal penalties) (Halter 2010, 157). Although both of these provisions
are important components of an effective safe harbor law, they are more closely connected to
how law enforcement perceives third party exploiters than the victims/survivors. At the same
time, statutes with increased penalties and lower burden of proof demonstrate an individual
state’s efforts to recognize who the true offenders are and to redirect its resources at
apprehending the actual criminals. For these reasons, I predict that both of these variables do not
play a significant role in decreasing the average number of annual arrests of commercial sexually
exploited children.
In theory, states that completely fulfill the criteria listed above should experience smaller
average numbers of child arrests whereas states that do not abide by all these standards should
experience higher average numbers of juvenile arrests. The unit of analysis is the individual
states and D.C. The 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia are included in this assessment:
the 18 states with safe harbor legislation under scrutiny and the other 32 (and D.C.) as control
variables (n=51). The number of arrests of adult sex workers is also used as a control variable, as
it has been previously demonstrated to be a salient variable in a similar study by MehlmanOrozco (2015). As previously mentioned in this paper, although CSEC is not prostitution, these
minors are being arrested for an act of prostitution; therefore, since they are being detained for
the same crime, it is reasonable to compare the trends in child arrests to the rates of adult arrests.
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This analysis starts in 1995, a year prior to the Declaration that provided the first working
definition of CSEC and, as indicated in the literature review, symbolized the first step in
reframing the issue. As previously mentioned, as of 2013, the last year that allows for pre and
post-enactment comparisons, 18 states6 have enacted safe harbor policies (Polaris Project 2013,
Weiss 2015). Figure 1 provides a visual representation of states that have passed such policies, as
of 2013, as well as some insights on policy diffusion patterns.

Figure 1. States With and Without Safe Harbor Legislation – As of December 31, 2013
The map above shows states that have passed and implemented safe harbor laws by the end of
2013. Interestingly, most states that have enacted such laws are located in the eastern part of the
country. amCharts © 2016. Created by Priscila B. M. dos Santos using amCharts © Interactive
JavaScript Maps.
The present paper focuses on the number of child arrests because law enforcement

6

Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington (Polaris Project 2013, Weiss 2015).
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officials are the first ones to come into contact with commercially sexually exploited children in
the vast majority of cases, and, therefore, they have a special role as first respondents. That is to
say, the future of these minors will largely depend on this first interaction and to some extent on
the police officer’s discretion. This paper attempts to demonstrate which combination of policies
or which format of safe harbor law has been most effective in diminishing the number of arrests
of sex trafficked minors through the use of ordinary least squares regression.
An important point of clarification is needed before concluding this chapter and moving
on to the next section. This study only attempts to provide a snapshot of the early years of
implementation of different safe harbor laws in the United States. These laws are still in the
process of being implemented for the first time or at the very early stages of implementation in
all 18 states. The post-enactment period ranges from 2010 to 2014 – they have been in effect for
a maximum of five years – which leaves a very small window of time to study policy
implementation. Hence, this investigation only seeks to begin to evaluate these very new policies
and not to render a definitive conclusion on these laws’ ability to reduce the criminalization of
CSEC (mean number of annual child arrests), as it takes time to put legislation into practice. A
more complete explanation of the challenges of policy implementation and the final stages of the
policy process7 can be found in chapter six.

7

Policy adoption, policy implementation, and policy evaluation.
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CHAPTER 4
MEASUREMENT AND PROCEDURES
Data Collection and Procedures
Using information on “Crime in the United States” provided by the FBI Uniform Crimes
Reporting (UCR) Program, I collected data on the number of child and adult arrests for
“prostitution and commercialized vice” from all 50 states and the District of Columbia between
1995 and 2014 (FBI 2016). Out of 1020 data points, there were a total of 77 missing values,
either because states were not able to provide data on the number of child arrests 8 or because
they were not able to furnish data in accordance with national UCR Program guidelines (FBI
2016). States with the highest number of missing values were Kansas (N= 7), Montana (N= 7),
and Vermont (N= 6); D.C. was also on the list with 8 missing values. In some cases, as a result
of various circumstances, it was necessary for the FBI to carry out different procedures in order
to estimate the number of child arrests for certain states9 (FBI 2010). In spite of all the missing
data and the imputations conducted by the FBI, the UCR Publication is still the most complete
and reliable source of information on persons arrested nationwide and on a state-by-state basis.
Therefore, in this analysis, years with missing values are signaled with a dash and estimates are
considered to be the actual number of arrests. In addition, no state is precluded from this
investigation in spite of the fact that some of them have 35 percent of missing data.
The main source of information on safe harbor legislation was the 2015 ECPAT “Steps to

8

There were no missing values for the number of adult arrests.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation offers a detailed explanation of the methods and “Criteria for State UCR Programs”
utilized on reports on “Crime in the United States” in its Methodology section of published reports (FBI 2010). The UCR
Publications also offer a thorough explanation of the criteria used in its “Estimation of State-Level Data” (Ibid. 2010). For the
sake of brevity, since each publication offers a different method of imputation, the details of “state-specific and offense-specific
estimation procedures” were omitted from this paper (Ibid. 2010). For instance, the information contained in this footnote was
derived from the Methodology section of the 2010 UCR Publication. However, there were a number of other publications that
could have been utilized for it.
9
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Safety” report (Weiss 2015). The Steps to Safety report provides comprehensive data not only on
the current status of existing safe harbor policies but also on the bills that originated the laws, as
they were passed as well as on the amendments that were adopted from their original enactment
until March 1, 2015 (Weiss 2015). This analysis only considers states that have adopted safe
harbor policies by 2013, the last year that enables pre- and post-enactment comparisons; as such,
only state laws passed in 2013 or earlier are included in the analysis.
Dependent Variable
The explained variable is analyzed through the use of measures of central tendency. For
states with safe harbor legislation, I divide the mean number of annual child arrests after the
effective date of the law (as opposed to the date of passage) by the mean number of annual child
arrests before (mean(2)/mean(1)). In this paper, the product of this division is called “ratio of the
means of the annual number of child arrests.” This distinction is particularly important because
in some cases these two dates vary greatly. For instance, New York’s “Safe Harbour for
Exploited Children Act” was signed into law on September 25, 2008, but only came into effect
on April 1, 2010 (Weiss 2015, 39-40).
Since the research question presented in this paper pertains to the average number of
annual—as opposed to monthly—arrests, I have to make adjustments on post-implementation
measurements of the dependent variable. The effective date of safe harbor policies varies
significantly from state-to-state. For example, Florida’s Safe Harbor Act (which was modeled
after New York’s law) took effect on January 1, 2013 (Weiss 2015, 24). On the other hand,
Connecticut’s safe harbor law, which was named “An Act Providing A Safe Harbor For
Exploited Children,” came into effect on October 1, 2010 (22). Louisiana’s Safe Harbor Law
(Senate Bill No. 88), in turn, took effect on June 24, 2013 (29).
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In the case of Louisiana, for example, the law has been in effect for 18 months: one half
year in 2013 and for the whole year of 2014. In 2013, there were a total of 14 commercially
sexually exploited children who had been arrested for prostitution in that state (FBI 2013). The
FBI UCR Publications only provide data on the number of annual arrests on a state-by-state
basis. Consequently, it is not possible to know with certainty which arrests took place in the first
half of 2013 and which ones occurred during the latter half of that year. As a means to address
this problem, in this paper, for states that had enacted safe harbor laws between January and June
(during the first half of a given year), I consider January 1 of that year the effective date of the
law. For states that had implemented safe harbor legislation between July and December (during
the second half of a given year), I consider January 1 of the following year the effective date of
the law.
I use 2012 as the base year of comparison for states without safe harbor laws, dividing
the mean number of annual child arrests after January 1, 2012, by the mean number of annual
child arrests before December 31, 2011. There are three components comprising my rationale for
using 2012 as the base year for comparison purposes: 2010 is the year in which the very first safe
harbor law came into effect; 2014 is the last year with available data on child arrests10; 2012 is
the median year of the post-enactment period (range 2010-2014). Thus, it is valid to use 2012 as
the base year for comparison purposes of arrest trends in states that have not passed safe harbor
legislation.
Independent Variables
Predictor variables are measured both individually and as a group. The control variable

10

I have submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with the Federal Bureau of Investigation for 2015 statistical
records on commercial sexual exploitation of children in the United States (number of child arrests), but at the time of this
writing (July 2016), I have not received an answer from the FBI’s FOIA Program. The status of my request reads that the FBI is
still searching its indices for potentially responsive documents. Therefore, this analysis stops in the year of 2014.
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(average number of annual adult arrests) is analyzed in the same way as the dependent variable.
For states with safe harbor legislation, I divide the mean number of annual adult arrests after the
effective date of the law by the mean number of annual adult arrests before (mean(2)/mean(1)).
By the same token, for states without safe harbor legislation, I divide the mean number of annual
adult arrests after January 1, 2012, by the mean number of annual adult arrests before December
31, 2011. Correspondingly, the product of this division is called “ratio of the means of the annual
number of adult arrests.” Based on a careful evaluation of the provisions of the different safe
harbor laws, the coding of each independent variable is described as follows.
(a) Decriminalization or Diversion
This variable is evaluated based on the amount of protection the decriminalization or
diversion provision offered to sex trafficked children. Zero (0) indicates the absence of these
clauses or language that does not explicitly prohibit criminal prosecution of children for
prostitution-related crimes (Weiss 2015, 21). One (1) represents states that refrain from arresting
and prosecuting children only upon certain conditions. For example, Louisiana’s safe harbor law
provides for mandatory diversion of only cooperative, consenting minors who have been charged
with “engaging in commercial sex for the first time” (29). On the other hand, Massachusetts’
safe harbor law, known as “An Act Relative to the Commercial Exploitation of People,” provides
that when a minor is arrested for a prostitution-related offense, any person, including the child,
may file a petition for care and protection (32). In case the petition is granted, but a court
eventually finds that a minor did not comply with the requirements of the program or that the
child’s welfare or safety is endangered, the court has the option to “remove the proceeding from
file, arraign the child, and restore the delinquency or criminal complaint to the docket” (General
Laws 2011; Weiss 2015, 32). States that automatically grant immunity to all children under 16
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years of age or states that mandate diversion for first “offenders” and discretionary diversion for
subsequent “offenses” are coded as two (2) (Weiss 2015, 46). Lastly, three (3) indicates states
that compulsorily grant immunity to all children under 18 years of age.
(b) Training11
Zero (0) designates statutes that fail to address the provision of training to first
respondents (especially to law enforcement agents), that have vague language on the issue, or
that simply recommend the provision of training to such professionals but do not mandate it.
Only statutes with clear language providing for mandatory training to first respondents and other
relevant actors who might come into contact with sex trafficked children are coded as three (3).
(c) Funding
State acts that are silent regarding funding for the implementation of safe harbor
policies or that do not clearly provide for appropriations are coded as zero (0). Statutes that

11

Explanation of coding procedure for explanatory variables (except decriminalization or diversion): all independent variables
have been coded in a manner somewhat similar to dummy variables. The explanatory variables are coded dichotomously with the
highest number indicating the presence of a given provision and the lowest score (0) the absence of the clause. The coding
reflects not only the presence or absence of a given provision but also the primary focus of the research: to measure which
provisions (or combination of provisions) are more likely to prevent child arrests for prostitution and commercialized vice. For
example, statutes with training provisions receive a score of three (3) (the same is true for statutes with funding provisions). In
this paper, I hypothesize that safe harbor laws with training and funding provisions are more likely to experience a lower mean
number of child arrests. For this reason, I decide to give them a higher weight (i.e., score) in comparison to the other provisions.
By the same token, I give a score of two (2) for state laws that provide for specialized services because I hypothesize that there is
an equal chance that specialized services may or may not be associated with a lower average number of annual arrests of CSEC.
Lastly, increased penalties and lower burden of proof receive each a score of one (1) because I propose that these two provisions
are less likely to be associated with a lower mean number of annual child arrests.
Furthermore, I decide to use a four-point scale for decriminalization or diversion but not for training, funding, and specialized
services because each state has its individual and special needs concerning these last three provisions. For example, there should
be no presumption that statutes that provide for a higher number of specialized services to victims are better than state laws with
a lower number of such services (the same is true for mandatory training and funding). I trust that elected officials, advocates,
and other relevant actors involved in the making of public policy are better informed on which kind (and number) of services best
suits the needs of child victims of sex trafficking in their states. In essence, what is good for one state is not necessarily good for
another; therefore, in this analysis, I choose not to “rank” these three provisions.
Most importantly, the initial idea in this project is to build a model in which each safe harbor law is to receive an index score
reflecting its respective efforts to combat CSEC. The coding used in this section also reflects the numbers that are to be assigned
to each provision as a means to build the model. The index score calls for a different coding; one that could capture the
importance of each provision more precisely than simply coding all independent variables as dummy variables. However, as
explained in chapter five, the index score was not statistically significant; therefore, it was removed from the analysis. Additional
information and a more detailed explanation about the coding methods and index scores can be found in chapter five and
Appendix E.
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require the allocation of funds or that impose fees on child traffickers that are eventually
allocated to victims/survivors (i.e. to support treatment, care, or other services or fund safe
houses) are coded as three (3) (Weiss 2015, 25-27).
(d) Specialized Services
State laws that do not address appropriate services to commercially sexually exploited
children, that do not have clear language on the issue, or that simply assert that minors may be
eligible for services, but do not explicitly set forth what those services are, are coded as zero (0)
(Weiss 2015, 22). Laws with clauses providing for specialized services to sex trafficked minors,
regardless of the number and type of services, are coded as two (2). Only statutes written with
clear mandatory language, requiring the provision of services to the child outside of the criminal
justice system, are considered to have a provision for specialized services.
(e) Increased Penalties
This variable is coded as a dummy variable. Statutes that are silent regarding increased
penalties to abusers (i.e. trafficker, pimps, johns) are coded as zero (0). Increased penalties, in
this context, mean higher sentences or fines imposed on persons convicted of child sex
trafficking or “elevated … level of felony classification” for crimes involving minors, such as
soliciting and pandering (Weiss 2015, 37). State laws that provide clear guidelines for the
imposition of increased penalties or that have mandatory language providing for higher
punishments for abusers are coded as one (1).
(f) Lower Burden of Proof
This variable is also coded as a dummy variable. State acts that require proof of force,
fraud or coercion to substantiate cases involving the commercial sexual exploitation of minors
are coded as zero (0). Statutes that do not make it a condition to demonstrate one of these three
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elements in sex trafficking cases involving children are coded as one (1).
All statistical analyses are conducted using IBM SPSS Predictive Analytics Software
22.0 for Windows. In addition, bivariate correlations between all measures are assessed using
Pearson correlation and significance is determined using two-tailed tests. Lastly, multiple
regression analyses and simple linear regression are carried out for each one of the
aforementioned explanatory variables.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
Tables 1 and 2 provide a checklist with the most protective and victim-centered
provisions of safe harbor laws based on statutes enacted by December 31, 2013. The first table
lists states in alphabetical order and the second groups states by clusters, according to similarities
in the legal framework of their safe harbor legislation. The purpose of Table 2 is to group
analogous laws and not to rank or grade them.
Provisions in the State Law
State
Arkansas
Connecticut
Florida
Illinois
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Nebraska
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Tennessee
Vermont
Washington

Decriminalization or
Diversion
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

Funding

Specialized
Services

✓

✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓

✓

Training

✓
✓
✓
✓

Increased
Penalties

Lower
Burden of
Proof
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓

✓

✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓

✓

✓

✓

Effective
Year
2013
2010
2013
2010
2013
2013
2013
2012
2011
2011
2013
2013
2010
2013
2012
2011
2011
2010

Table 1. Safe Harbor Legislation: State Laws Provisions (2013)
The table depicted is a checklist with the provisions contained in each one of the 18 safe harbor
laws enacted by December 31, 2013. With the exception of Arkansas, all states had adopted
provisions for decriminalization or diversion. The second most common provision is lower
burden of proof. The table offers a good visual representation of the existing variances between
each state’s law.
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Provisions in the State Law
Decriminalization or
Diversion

State
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Florida
Washington
New Jersey
Nebraska
Illinois
Ohio
Arkansas
North Carolina
Vermont
Michigan
Tennessee
New York
Connecticut
Minnesota

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

Training

Funding

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

Specialized
Services

Increased
Penalties

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

Lower
Burden of
Proof
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓

Effective
Year
2013
2013
2013
2012
2013
2010
2013
2013
2010
2012
2013
2013
2011
2011
2011
2010
2010
2011

Table 2. Safe Harbor Legislation: State Laws Provisions By Cluster (2013)
The table above is a checklist with the provisions included in each one of the 18 safe harbor laws
grouped by cluster. Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Massachusetts have the statutes that most
comprehensively address the problem of domestic minor sex trafficking within their states. Most
safe harbor laws came into effect in the year of 2013.
The first step is conducting a correlational analysis of all the predictor variables in order
to check for multicollinearity. The existence of multicollinearity may affect the reliability of the
estimated regression coefficients, making it difficult to estimate the relevant regression equation
(Ali 2008, 220; Bennett 1986, 345). If the absolute value of Pearson correlation exceeds, or is
very close to |0.8|, there is a high probability that collinearity exists (Bennett 1986, 345).
Correlational analyses are run with and without the 32 states as a control variable. The results are
presented in Tables 3 and 4.
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Lower
Adult
Decriminalization
Specialized Increased
Training Funding
Burden Arrests
or Diversion
Services Penalties
of Proof (Average)
Pearson Correlation
1
.408**
.392**
.304*
.688** .746**
-.129
Decriminalization
Sig. (2-tailed)
.003
.004
.030
.000
.000
.366
or Diversion
N
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
Pearson Correlation
.408**
1
.664**
.455**
.622** .521**
-.105
Training
Sig. (2-tailed)
.003
.000
.001
.000
.000
.463
N
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
Pearson Correlation
.392**
.664**
1
.738**
.702** .692**
-.141
Funding
Sig. (2-tailed)
.004
.000
.000
.000
.000
.325
N
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
Pearson Correlation
.304*
.455**
.738**
1
.560** .580**
-.121
Specialized
Sig. (2-tailed)
.030
.001
.000
.000
.000
.397
Services
N
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
Pearson Correlation
.688**
.622**
.702**
.560**
1
.853**
-.105
Increased Penalties Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.462
N
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
Pearson Correlation
.746**
.521**
.692**
.580**
.853**
1
-.131
Lower Burden of
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.361
Proof
N
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
Pearson Correlation
-.129
-.105
-.141
-.121
-.105
-.131
1
Adult Arrests
Sig. (2-tailed)
.366
.463
.325
.397
.462
.361
(Average)
N
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 3. Correlation Matrix of Predictor Variables Including All 50 States and the District
of Columbia (n=51)
The table above is a correlation matrix of all the independent variables included in this
investigation. The highest correlation found is between increased penalties and lower burden of
proof. The correlation coefficients demonstrate that funding highly correlates with three other
variables: specialized services, increased penalties, and lower burden of proof.
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Lower
Adult
Decriminalization
Specialized Increased
Training Funding
Burden Arrests
or Diversion
Services Penalties
of Proof (Average)
Pearson Correlation
1
-.114
-.447
-.447
.228
.134
.192
Decriminalization
Sig. (2-tailed)
.653
.063
.063
.363
.597
.445
or Diversion
N
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
Pearson Correlation
-.114
1
.484*
.204
.403
.152
-.069
Training
Sig. (2-tailed)
.653
.042
.417
.098
.546
.784
N
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
Pearson Correlation
-.447
.484*
1
.575*
.433
.329
-.173
Funding
Sig. (2-tailed)
.063
.042
.013
.073
.183
.492
N
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
Pearson Correlation
-.447
.204
.575*
1
.255
.209
-.128
Specialized
Sig. (2-tailed)
.063
.417
.013
.307
.405
.612
Services
N
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
Pearson Correlation
.228
.403
.433
.255
1
.670**
.142
Increased Penalties Sig. (2-tailed)
.363
.098
.073
.307
.002
.574
N
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
Pearson Correlation
.134
.152
.329
.209
.670**
1
.143
Lower Burden of
Sig. (2-tailed)
.597
.546
.183
.405
.002
.571
Proof
N
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
Pearson Correlation
.192
-.069
-.173
-.128
.142
.143
1
Adult Arrests
Sig. (2-tailed)
.445
.784
.492
.612
.574
.571
(Average)
N
18
18
18
18
18
18
18
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 4. Correlation Matrix of Predictor Variables Including Only States with Safe Harbor
Laws (2013) (n=18)
The table depicted is a correlation matrix of all the predictor variables included in this study. The
correlation coefficients indicate that once the 32 control variables are removed from the analysis,
there are no multicollinearity problems among the independent variables (based on a 0.8 cutoff).
As depicted in Table 3, the results of the correlational analysis suggest that increased
penalties and lower burden of proof, as expected, are highly correlated with each other (r= .853).
Decriminalization or diversion and lower burden of proof have also demonstrated to be highly
correlated with one another (r= .746). Funding appears to be the most problematic variable,
showing strong correlations with three other explanatory variables: specialized services (r=
.738), increased penalties (r= 702), and lower burden of proof (r= .692). Since the correlational
analysis with all 50 states and D.C. presented problems of multicollinearity, I decided to run the
same test without using the 32 states as a control variable. The results are presented in Table 4,
which does not show multicollinearity. Another way to address a multicollinearity problem is to
remove one of the highly correlated variables from the model, which is attempted later in the
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analysis.
The internal consistency and reliability of the index are assessed using Cronbach’s alpha.
Cronbach’s alpha gauges the extent to which the variables that compose the index have interitem reliability (Mujis 2011, 217). A Cronbach’s alpha of 0.7 or higher is considered to be
satisfactory for research purposes (217). As with the correlational analysis, I chose to run the
Cronbach’s alpha test with and without the 32 states as a control variable. The results of the test
are presented in Tables 5 and 5b and Tables 6 and 6b.
Cronbach's Alpha
.842

Cronbach's Alpha
Based on
Standardized Items
.898

N of Items
6

Table 5. Cronbach’s Alpha: Reliability Statistics Including All 50 States and D.C. (n=51)
The Reliability Statistics table depicts the actual value for Cronbach’s alpha, .842, which
suggests a high level of internal consistency for the index proposed in this investigation.
Provisions
Decriminalization or
Diversion
Training
Funding
Specialized Services
Increased Penalties
Lower Burden of Proof

Scale Mean if
Item Deleted

Scale Variance if Corrected Item-Total Squared Multiple
Item Deleted
Correlation
Correlation

Cronbach's Alpha if
Item Deleted

1.80

10.641

.534

.622

.845

2.10
1.92
2.20
2.29
2.24

10.450
8.954
12.121
13.172
12.984

.646
.763
.632
.846
.834

.510
.742
.561
.783
.816

.813
.790
.817
.816
.813

Table 5b. Cronbach’s Alpha: Item-Total Statistics (n=51)
The Item-Total Statistics table presents several columns, but the most relevant is the one that
reads “Cronbach’s Alpha if Item Deleted.” This last column shows the value that Cronbach’s
alpha would be if one of the items were to be removed from the index. The results of the
Cronbach’s alpha indicate that it is not desirable to delete any item from the index.
Cronbach's Alpha
.490

Cronbach's Alpha
Based on
Standardized Items
.607

N of Items
6

Table 6. Cronbach’s Alpha: Reliability Statistics Including Only States with Safe Harbor
Laws (2013) (n=18)
The Reliability Statistics table depicts the actual value for Cronbach’s alpha, .490, which
suggests a low level of internal consistency for the index offered in this study.
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Provisions
Decriminalization or
Diversion
Training
Funding
Specialized Services
Increased Penalties
Lower Burden of Proof

Scale Mean if
Item Deleted

Scale Variance if Corrected Item-Total Squared Multiple
Item Deleted
Correlation
Correlation

Cronbach's Alpha if
Item Deleted

5.11

13.399

-.312

.475

.681

5.94
5.44
6.22
6.50
6.33

6.526
6.026
9.124
9.794
10.706

.431
.495
.313
.656
.434

.320
.599
.403
.634
.475

.313
.254
.413
.369
.436

Table 6b. Cronbach’s Alpha: Item-Total Statistics (n=18)
The Item-Total Statistics table presents several columns, but the most relevant is the one that
reads “Cronbach’s Alpha if Item Deleted.” This last column shows the value that Cronbach’s
alpha would be if one of the items were to be removed from the index. The results of the
Cronbach’s alpha suggest that it is not desirable to delete any item from the index other than
decriminalization or diversion, which would cause the Cronbach’s alpha to increase to .681.
As illustrated in Table 5, the scale that includes all 50 states and D.C. has a Cronbach’s
alpha of .842, which indicates a high level of internal consistency. As depicted in Table 5b, with
the exception of decriminalization and diversion (.845), if one of the items of the scale were to
be deleted, the Cronbach’s alpha would decrease. On the other hand, Table 6 shows a
Cronbach’s alpha of .49; although there is no set interpretation of what constitutes an acceptable
alpha value, the general “rule of thumb” posits that a score of <.5 is considered to be
unacceptable (George and Mallery 2016, 240). Table 6b suggests that the removal of any item,
except decriminalization and diversion (.681), would result in a lower Cronbach’s alpha.
Although the Cronbach’s alpha indicates that the index with all 50 states and D.C. has a
high level of reliability and consistency, the results of the regression analysis indicate that the
index score is not significant at the .05-level, the accepted cutoff in political science (Le Roy
2012, 186). The predictor variables account for only 11.8 percent of the variation in the ratio of
the means of the annual number of child arrests, R2= .118, (F(2,48) = 3.220, p=.174) (See
Appendix D).
The next step is to remove one of the highly correlated independent variables as a means
to offset multicollinearity and find a set of concurrent explanatory variables for the ratio of the
35

means of the annual number of child arrests. As mentioned earlier, funding is the most
problematic explanatory variable. A multiple regression analysis is run with decriminalization
and diversion, training, specialized services, lower burden of proof, increased penalties, the ratio
of the means of the annual number of adult arrests, and the 32 states entered as predictors and
ratio of the means of the annual number of child arrests as the explained variable. Tables 7 and
7b show the results of this analysis.
Std. Error of the
Estimate
1
.374a
.140
.022
.71704
a. Predictors: (Constant), Decriminalization or Diversion, Training, Specialized
Services, Increased Penalties, Lower Burden of Proof, Adult Arrests (Average)
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Table 7. Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Mean Number
of Child Arrests Excluding Funding (1995-2014) (n=51)
The Model Summary table shows a coefficient of determination of .140, which is the proportion
of variation in the Ratio of the Means of the Annual Number of Child Arrests that can be
explained by the explanatory variables (excluding funding).

Model

Unstandardized Coefficients

B
Std. Error
1
(Constant)
.678
.144
Decriminalization or Diversion
-.169
.141
Training
-.081
.126
Specialized Services
-.053
.181
Increased Penalties
.195
.519
Lower Burden of Proof
.082
.504
Adult Arrests (Average)
.101
.056
a. Dependent Variable: Ratio of the Means of the Annual Number of Child Arrests

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
-.265
-.116
-.054
.112
.051
.254

t

Sig.

4.715
-1.198
-.637
-.293
.375
.163
1.793

.000
.237
.527
.771
.709
.871
.080

Table 7b. Coefficientsª (n=51)
The Coefficients table presents the statistical significance of the independent variables included
in the model. The last column is the most relevant for the purposes of this analysis. None of the
six variables added statistical significance to the model.
The five predictors accounted for only 14 percent of the variation in the dependent variable, R 2=
.140, F(6,44) = 1.191, p >.05. The results of the multiple regression analysis suggest that none of
the explanatory variables are statistically significant at the .05-level.
Multiple linear regressions are also calculated including only states that have enacted safe
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harbor legislation by December 31, 2013. No explanatory variable is statistically significant at
the .05 level. The results of the analyses suggest that dropping the control variable only
contributes to a slight increase in R square values. In addition, a single linear regression is run
with the index score as the explanatory variable and the ratio of means of the annual number of
child arrests as the dependent variable. The results indicate that the index is not significant at the
.05 level (See Appendix C). The index score accounts for 34.9 percent of the variation in the
dependent variable (R2= .349). Since the regression analyses with the index scores proved not to
be significant at the .05 level and the Cronbach’s alpha tests showed inconsistent results, I
decided to remove the scale from this analysis. An explanation of the rationale behind the index
score can be found in one of the appendixes (Appendix E).
Since the correlation matrix of independent variables including only the 18 states with
safe harbor laws do not present a problem of multicollinearity, they have all been incorporated in
the multiple regression analysis presented in Tables 8 and 8b.
Std. Error of the
Estimate
1
.755a
.570
.269
.31290
a. Predictors: (Constant), Training, Lower Burden of Proof, Decriminalization or
Diversion, Specialized Services, Funding, Increased Penalties, Adult Arrests
(Average)
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Table 8. Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Ratio of the
Means of the Annual Number of Child Arrests (1995-2014) (n=18)
The Model Summary table shows a coefficient of determination of .570, which is the proportion
of variation in the Ratio of the Means of the Annual Number of Child Arrests that can be
explained by the independent variables.
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Model

Unstandardized Coefficients

B
Std. Error
1
(Constant)
.550
.291
Decriminalization or Diversion
-.199
.102
Training
-.053
.061
Funding
-.053
.079
Specialized Services
-.004
.096
Increased Penalties
.180
.253
Lower Burden of Proof
.096
.246
Adult Arrests (Average)
.369
.138
a. Dependent Variable: Ratio of the Means of the Annual Number of Child Arrests

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
-.558
-.216
-.224
-.011
.247
.112
.585

t

Sig.

1.889
-1.951
-.858
-.673
-.041
.713
.389
2.684

.088
.080
.411
.516
.968
.492
.706
.023

Table 8b. Coefficientsª (n=18)
The Coefficients table presents the statistical significance of the independent variables included
in the model. The last column is the most relevant for the purposes of this analysis. With the
exception of the Ratio of the Mean of the Annual Number of Adult Arrests, none of the variables
added statistical significance to the model.
As depicted in Table 8, 57 percent of the variation in the dependent variable can be
explained by the explanatory variables included in the model (R 2= .570). However, as illustrated
in Table 8b, except for the ratio of the mean of the annual number of adult arrests (.023), none of
the relationships are statistically significant at the .05 level. For every standard deviation increase
in the ratio of the means of the annual number of adult arrests, we can expect to see, on average,
a 58.5 percent of a standard deviation increase in the ratio of the means of the annual number of
child arrests, holding all other variables constant.
Simple linear regressions are calculated as a means to assess how well each independent
variable can explain changes in the dependent variable. No predictor variable is significant at the
.05 level. Decriminalization and diversion account for 47.4 percent of the variation in the ratio of
the means of the annual number of child arrests (R2= .474), training explains 36.3 percent of the
variation (R2= .363), funding accounts for 34.5 percent (R2= .345), specialized services explain
36.5 percent (R2= .365), increased penalties account for 34.2 percent (R2= .342), and lower
burden of proof explains 35.0 percent of the variation (R2= .350) (See Appendix C).
Lastly, Table 9 shows the central tendency of the dependent variable. Specifically, it
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presents the mean number of annual child arrests as well as the percentage change before and
after the enactment of safe harbor legislation.
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Number of Child Arrests
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Mean Before SHLª (N=51)

Mean After SHL (N=51)

Ratio of the Means

Percentage Change (%)

0.86
2.50
30.18
2.89
390.71
10.41
4.56
0.31
0.40
99.13
31.53
8.20
0.38
64.27
6.88
2.27
0.67
3.82
8.67
1.85
28.53
17.76
21.44
25.35
2.53
11.12
0.20
3.33
50.81
0.87
23.39
4.38
26.00
12.53
1.00
16.00
9.00
13.88
18.06
2.24
4.82
0.54
15.75
104.59
10.56
0.27
9.12
32.33
1.00
21.50
0.46

0.00
0.33
7.00
2.50
205.00
7.00
1.00
0.33
0.00
27.50
24.33
0.00
0.33
7.50
3.67
3.33
0.00
1.50
9.50
1.33
7.67
2.67
7.25
3.67
3.00
4.33
0.33
0.00
82.00
0.33
11.50
2.00
13.80
12.00
0.33
7.00
4.33
1.33
16.33
0.00
7.33
1.00
5.25
86.67
16.33
0.33
2.33
17.00
0.67
27.67
2.00

0.00
0.13
0.23
0.87
0.52
0.67
0.22
1.08
0.00
0.28
0.77
0.00
0.87
0.12
0.53
1.47
0.00
0.39
1.10
0.72
0.27
0.15
0.34
0.14
1.19
0.39
1.67
0.00
1.61
0.38
0.49
0.46
0.53
0.96
0.33
0.44
0.48
0.10
0.90
0.00
1.52
1.86
0.33
0.83
1.55
1.22
0.26
0.53
0.67
1.29
4.33

-100.00
-86.67
-76.80
-13.46
-47.53
-32.77
-78.08
8.33
-100.00
-72.26
-22.82
-100.00
-13.33
-88.33
-46.72
47.06
-100.00
-60.77
9.62
-27.78
-73.13
-84.99
-66.18
-85.54
18.60
-61.02
66.67
-100.00
61.38
-61.54
-50.83
-54.29
-46.92
-4.20
-66.67
-56.25
-51.85
-90.40
-9.55
-100.00
52.03
85.71
-66.67
-17.14
54.64
22.22
-74.41
-47.42
-33.33
28.68
333.33

Table 9. Child Arrests Before and After the Enactment of Safe Harbor Laws (n=51)
The table depicted shows the central tendency of the Ratio of the Means of the Annual Number
of Child Arrests. A complete explanation of the results can be found in chapter six.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study has examined the implementation of safe harbor laws in 18 U.S. states. The
goal of this paper was to answer the following research question: which model of safe harbor law
is most effective in decreasing the average number of annual arrests of commercially sexually
exploited children? Based on an interpretation of the literature review presented in this paper, I
hypothesized that as states enacted safe harbor laws with a higher number of provisions
safeguarding children’s rights, we could expect, on average, to see a decrease in the average
number of annual arrests of sex trafficked minors. I also proposed that some provisions were
more likely to prevent an arrest than others. Statutes with decriminalization or diversion,
training, and funding provisions were more likely to experience a decrease in the average
number of annual child arrests whereas state laws with increased penalties and lower burden of
proof were less likely to have a lower average number of annual arrests of sex trafficked
children. On the other hand, I expected to obtain ambiguous results from statutes with
specialized services, which could either cause the average number of annual child arrests to
increase or decrease.
As a means to answer this research question and test these hypotheses, I collected data
from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (1995-2014), the 2015 ECPAT Steps to Safety report, and
the Polaris Project website, and analyzed them through the use of OLS regression. The results of
the data analysis suggested that the independent variables had no discernible effect on the
dependent variable, both individually and as a group. Therefore, I failed to reject the null
hypotheses. In an attempt to find statistically significant relationships, I tested the data without
using the 32 states as a control variable. Nevertheless, the findings of the data analysis indicate
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that while removing the control variable did slightly increase the coefficients of determination, it
did not contribute to producing statistically significant results.
Since only one of the results was statistically significant at the .05 level12, it was not
possible to draw any meaningful conclusions from this data analysis. Moreover, the lack of
statistical significance prevented me from combining different provisions in order to evaluate
their effectiveness as a group and consequently answering the proposed research question.
Furthermore, as previously mentioned and for the reasons set forth above, the index score was
unwarranted and thus, removed from the analysis.
Consequently, any attempts to interpret these results would lead to tenuous conclusions at
best. Notwithstanding, the findings of the descriptive statistics could potentially shed some light
on the reasons for such results. With the exception of Louisiana and Vermont, all states that had
enacted safe harbor legislation by the end of 2013 experienced a decrease in the mean number of
annual child arrests in the years following the implementation of the law. Louisiana had a 9.62
percent increase while Vermont had a 22.22 percent increase. Louisiana has a very
comprehensive and complete safe harbor legislation, fulfilling all the criteria of the basic legal
framework for the successful implementation of such laws (Weiss 2015, 29-30-31). Louisiana is
a good example of a state that has a very thorough safe harbor law but that has not experienced
lower numbers of arrests of commercially sexually exploited children in the years subsequent to
the enactment of the act. Vermont, in turn, has a law with only three of the provisions evaluated
in this paper: decriminalization (immunity for individuals under 18 years of age), increased
penalties, and lower burden of proof (Ibid. 2015, 44-45). The experiences of the state of

12

The ratio of the means of the annual number of adult arrests – adult arrests (average) – added statistically significantly to the
model that included only the 18 states with safe harbor legislation, p=.023. The implications of these results are discussed later in
this analysis.
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Vermont, to some extent, corroborate the hypotheses put forward in this thesis.
On the other hand, 31.25 percent (N= 10) of states without safe harbor laws experienced
an increase in the average number of annual arrests of CSEC after 2012 (for the purpose of this
analysis the 32 control states). By contrast, approximately 11 percent (N= 2) of states with safe
harbor legislation experienced an increase in the mean number of annual child arrests in the
years following the implementation of the law. Nevertheless, according to the results of the
analysis, it is not possible to link these findings to the presence or absence of a given provision in
a statute or even to the presence or absence of a safe harbor law.
The results of the study demonstrate that the average number of annual adult arrests for
prostitution and commercialized vice had also decreased in states with safe harbor laws. Adult
arrests (average) was essentially the only independent variable that had actually affected the
dependent variable, ratio of the means of the annual number of child arrests. There are several
potential explanations for this result. First, there is a chance that, for some reason, the police in
these states focused their attention and resources on apprehending other types of “offenders”
(i.e., wars on drugs, larceny-theft, crime in the streets, etc.). Second, it might be the case that the
passing of the TVPA had also contributed to making law enforcement agents more aware of the
issue of adult sex trafficking and better trained at identifying such cases. Increased law
enforcement awareness and training on the issue of trafficking in persons might be especially
true for states with safe harbor laws since the enactment of such policies clearly represent efforts
to address the problem of sex trafficking within their borders. Changes in society values might
have also made police officers more sensitive to the plight of sex workers (i.e., individuals might
not voluntarily become sex workers; their work in the sex industry might be a result of their lack
of choice). Lastly, prostitution diversion programs used as an alternative to jail, which
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contributes to reduce recidivism, might have played an important part in decreasing the mean
number of adult arrests in states that have adopted safe harbor legislation. These are all possible
explanations for the general decrease in mean number of annual arrests of adult sex workers in
states with safe harbor laws. Nonetheless, it is not possible to control for all these alternative
explanations. Ultimately, the results of this analysis led me to conclude that the overall decline in
the arrest rates of CSEC in states with safe harbor policies may or may not be a direct result of
the enactment of these laws.
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Studies
The present study has a number of limitations. First, and probably the greatest deficiency
of this study, there was not enough time to implement these laws. It was simply too soon to
evaluate the effectiveness of safe harbor legislation, as it takes time to translate laws into
practice. Eight out of the eighteen state laws under scrutiny in this paper came into effect in
2013, which leaves only one to two years to evaluate arrest trends in the post-enactment period.
In essence, time was the missing component in this study. Second, this paper utilizes secondary
data as its main source of information. Therefore, the accuracy of these findings hinges on the
quality of the data collected by the FBI UCR Program.
Third, safe harbor laws do not necessarily prohibit commercially sexually exploited
children from being arrested. For instance, the Illinois Safe Children Act (ISCA) provides that
sex trafficked children shall not be arrested or detained but placed under temporary protective
custody; in this context, temporary protective custody means “custody within a hospital or other
medical facility, or a place previously designed for such custody … including a licensed foster
home, group home or other institution”; the law specifically states that minors may not be put in
a “jail or other place of detention for criminal or juvenile offenders” (Weiss 2015, 26).
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Conversely, under the provisions of Florida’s Safe Harbor Act, minors can still be arrested and
charged with juvenile delinquency for committing an act of prostitution (24). There are certain
conditions that need to be met in order to determine that the child is a sex trafficking victim in
that state. Fourth, the dependent variable was calculated through the use of a measure of central
tendency, which has its limitations. For instance, in skewed distributions, in this case, years with
unusual high numbers of child arrests, the mean number would not accurately reflect the arrest
trends for that given state (Heiman 2013, 68).
Lastly, Connecticut’s and Michigan’s safe harbor laws only provide immunity from
prosecution to individuals who are 15 years of age or younger. Nevertheless, the FBI UCR
Program does not break down its state-level data on child arrests for prostitution and
commercialized vice by age. Consequently, child arrest numbers for Connecticut and Michigan
may not accurately reflect the criminalization of CSEC in those two states. For example, it might
be the case that minors arrested during the post-implementation period were between the ages of
16 and 17; it that is true, the safe harbor laws of these two states were effective in decreasing the
average number of annual arrests of sex trafficked children. However, the data collected does not
allow for this type of conclusion.
Future endeavors should seek to address the limitations of this study. I would recommend
waiting a minimum of five years before engaging in similar analysis, as it would give these laws
enough time to take effect. A larger dataset would allow investigators to utilize more robust and
sophisticated statistical procedures, such as Logistic Regression and Time Series Analysis, which
should produce more sound results and provide a more nuanced view of the implementation of
these laws.
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The goal of this paper was not to offer a one-size-fits-all solution to this problem or to
find the ideal safe harbor law; as wisely stated by Weiss, the “variety and complexity of state
laws and the particularized and varying needs of states prevents drafting a single model Safe
Harbor Law” (1-8-9). The purpose of this study was to identify the statutes that had obtained
success, as measured by a lower number of arrests of commercially sexually exploited children,
in recognizing that sex trafficked children are victims/survivors and not criminals and, most
importantly, in protecting them from their abusers and providing them with the tools that they
need in order to “exit the commercial sex industry and develop their full potential” (Girls
Educational and Mentoring Services 2016).
Implications for Policy and Contribution to the Field
The conclusions of this study suggest that there is no credible evidence that safe harbor
laws, in whatever format, are associated with lower average numbers of annual arrests of CSEC;
at the same time, there is no evidence that they are not. There is a high probability that the small
amount of data on post-implementation years prevented me from detecting a true underlying
effect. There is also a chance that, other than decriminalization or diversion, which had a p-value
of .08 (in the model that only included states with safe harbor legislation), training13, funding,
specialized services, increased penalties, and lower burden of proof provisions do not have an
effect on the mean number of annual arrests of sex trafficked children. While the aforementioned
provisions are important to providing CSEC with the services and protection they need and
preventing their exploitation, it might be the case that they do not have a direct effect on arrest
rates of sex trafficked children. Additionally, there has been a general declining rate in the
average number of annual arrests of CSEC in the U.S., in great part, due to efforts to reframe the

13

Although I strongly believe that this first variable does indeed affect arrests rates of CSEC, as suggested by evidence presented
in the review of the literature.
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issue and changes in perceptions of children engaging in commercial sex acts. As pointed out in
the literature review, the TVPA of 2000 represented a watershed in the fight against the sex
trafficking of minors nationwide; its enactment and implementation clearly contributed to
changes in perception of CSEC (they began to be recognized as victims and not offenders),
which was instrumental in reducing the number of minors arrested for prostitution.
The study’s findings suggest important implications for policy. First and foremost, there
need to be continued efforts to educate and train police officers, law enforcement professionals,
and relevant actors on the issue of domestic minor sex trafficking. Law enforcement personnel
need to fully comprehend the exploitative nature of this crime. Despite their safe harbor laws,
Louisiana and Vermont experienced a higher average number of annual arrests of CSEC in the
years after the enactment of the legislation. Oftentimes, a new law is not enforced simply due to
lack of knowledge and awareness on the part of the professionals responsible to put it into
practice. Second, it is necessary to devise alternative ways of referring minors to specialized
services and providing them with the help they need, other than through the law enforcement and
criminal justice systems. Sex trafficked children need protection and access to tailored services
without the need of going through a system inherently created to punish criminal behavior. As
previously mentioned, the Illinois Safe Children Act proved that it is possible to assist CSEC
without the need for an arrest or detention. Most importantly, there is maybe too much
responsibility in the hands of police officers, who often need to decide the fate of CSEC. There is
really no reason to believe that these professionals should bear the sole responsibility of dealing
with this social problem.
Third, rather than solely focusing on punishing criminals and helping child victims of sex
trafficking, states could also try to address the underlying social, economic, political, and often
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racial issues that laid the foundation for this problem in the first place (Lloyd 2012). That is,
states should do the former without forgetting the latter. Minors engaging in commercial sex acts
should be able to have access to tools that could potentially shield them from their exploiters.
While relevant actors might erroneously concentrate solely on providing help to victims and
penalizing traffickers, vulnerable minors are being targeted by criminals and becoming new
victims of this crime every day. If current policy interventions directed at solving the issue are
not accomplishing their goal, emphasis should be given to alternative ways of approaching the
problem.
Lastly, and probably the most important implication of this study, the findings of this
analysis highlight the differences between policy adoption and policy implementation. States that
had adopted safe harbor laws were simply signifying that they were able to come up with an
agreed upon solution to the problem of CSEC and to build majority support for these policy
proposals in their legislatures (Anderson, Brady, and Bullock, III 2000, 14-16). The ratification
of a law has more to do with policy acceptance and adherence than with enforcement and
implementation. In essence, policy adoption is not the same as policy implementation; the latter
is much harder than the former as it takes time to effectuate change. Therefore, one cannot
assume that the passing of a safe harbor policy would automatically bring about the
decriminalization of CSEC. It may take a few years before all the relevant actors become aware
of the policy change and begin to refrain from arresting and prosecuting minors for prostitutionrelated charges.
The process of carrying out a policy is also hindered by the degree of change required to
implement the new policy (Wilson 2016, 49). The success of a newly enacted law hinges on two
elements of change: the cost of change and the amount of change required from the target
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population (i.e., the population affected by the policy) (Ibid. 2016, 49). Besides CSEC, the main
populations affected by these policies (and that are involved in the policy implementation
process) are law enforcement officers and criminal justice professionals. The effectiveness of
safe harbor legislation will hinge on how quickly these two populations are able to stop seeing
CSEC through the lens of anti-prostitution laws and start treating them as victims of commercial
sexual exploitation. The success of safe harbor policies also depends on how strongly these
actors feel about these policy changes: are they in favor of it or against it? Are they morally
opposed to it? Most importantly, states need to allocate appropriate funds for the enforcement of
these laws (Ibid. 2016, 49). The results of this analysis demonstrate that only ten states have a
funding provision for the enactment of safe harbor policies and only seven have mandatory
training for the populations responsible to carry out these laws.
Finally, the agency responsible for the implementation of the law also affects the
probability of success of a newly enacted policy (Wilson 2016, 49). Essentially, the agency in
question needs to prioritize the new law and be fully committed to achieving the policy
objectives (Ibid. 2016, 49). All these factors greatly influence the speed and ease at which a
novel law will be put into practice. States are oftentimes quick to sign on these new ideas but
slow to carry them out. Ultimately, change is very difficult. Implementation is much harder than
policy adoption and is going to take time before these policies sink in. Thus, the results of this
analysis should not lead one to quickly dismiss these laws and label them as ineffective.
This thesis provides important background information and a very practical framework
for investigators who wish to answer the proposed research question in the future. It points out
important aspects of the issue as well as factors future researchers should pay attention to and
take into consideration before engaging in similar analysis. To my knowledge, this is the first
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study to offer a systematic evaluation of the implementation of safe harbor laws. It is also the
first political science study to address the issue of domestic minor sex trafficking, state-level
policy responses to the commercial sexual exploitation of children in the United States, and the
effects of state legislation on the criminalization of CSEC. This work adds to the narrative
seeking to reframe the issue of CSEC and shed more light on more optimal ways of dealing with
this issue. States seeking to adopt safe harbor laws might refer to this study as a means to make a
more informed and educated decision.
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APPENDIX C: SINGLE LINEAR REGRESSIONS INCLUDING ONLY STATES WITH
SAFE HARBOR LAWS
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APPENDIX D: INDEX WITH ALL 50 STATES AND D.C.
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APPENDIX E: SAFE HARBOR PROVISIONS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE WEIGHTS
Based on a careful evaluation of the provisions of the different safe harbor laws, each
state was to receive an index score, with a maximum score of 13 and a minimum score of one.
Each provision was to be weighted differently; the prescriptions that were more likely to prevent
an arrest would receive a higher score whereas the ones that were less likely to preclude an
apprehension would receive a lower score. If the index score had demonstrated to be significant
at the .05 level, safe harbor provisions would be weighted in the following way: (a)
decriminalization or diversion, training, and funding would each receive a score of 3; (b)
specialized services would be given a score of 2; and (c) increased penalties and lower burden of
proof would each receive a score of 1. The following table depicts the provisions with their
respective weights.

Provision

Weight

Decriminalization and Diversion

3

Training

3

Funding

3

Specialized

2

Increased Penalties

1

Lower Burden of Proof

1

Maximum Score

13
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